

crime we are talking about, the violent crime, is really heavily concentrated in certain areas. Princeton Prof. John DeJulio reports that while Philadelphia—just as an example—while Philadelphia contains only 14 percent of the population of the State of Pennsylvania, it accounts for 42 percent of the entire State's crime—an unbelievable figure. What is happening to the children who live in these high-crime areas? They are living a life, frankly, that would be unimaginable for Americans of my parents' generation.

Over 25 percent of inner-city children growing up in this country think they are likely to be shot at some point in their life—25 percent, one-fourth of these children growing up. A male teenager growing up in an inner city is at least six times more likely to be a victim of violent crime than a male teenager growing up somewhere else in the country—six times. I do not think we can give up on these young people, these young Americans. They need hope and opportunity every bit as much as any other child in this country. They need a chance. And I believe putting more police in their neighborhoods is something we can do to start giving them that chance, the chance to live without constant fear for themselves and for their families.

Let us make no mistake about it, putting more police into those crime-infested areas, the most crime-ridden areas of our country, is not going to solve all the problems of those communities. We all know that and we all have an obligation to work on the other problems—welfare reform, jobs, making sure the schools in every neighborhood in this country are good schools so the children do in fact have a chance and opportunity. But no matter what we do with our schools, no matter what we do with welfare, no matter what we do with job creation, nothing positive can really take place as long as crime does exist.

So, having community policing, having law enforcement targeted to these areas, I believe, is clearly the right thing to do. I do not think it is fair to say to that child who, because of accident of birth, happens to be growing up in an area where he or she is six times more likely to be killed than a child in a suburb, I do not think it is fair to say to that child: We cannot do anything about it. We are, for political reasons, going to spread out these police officers, these new police men and women. We are going to spread them out throughout the country because for political reasons we think we can get more votes that way for a particular bill. I do not think that is right. I think the right thing to do is to target where these police men and women go, and that is what our bill does.

Our bill does many other things. I see my colleague from Michigan is on the floor, so I am not going to speak very much longer, let me advise him. But let me say in conclusion that this bill is aimed at doing things that matter,

doing things that will make a difference, doing things that will get the job done. It is a very pragmatic bill, a very hardheaded bill. And it basically says this: If we as a Congress have made the decision, as apparently we have, that over the next 5 years we are going to spend \$30 billion on this very, very important problem, then we should spend it correctly and we should listen to the men and women who are professionals, who can tell us how to spend it: More technology, more police officers deployed correctly, and finally, taking off the streets the violent repeat career criminals.

Let me conclude by saying that I want to thank the original cosponsors of this bill, Senator ASHCROFT, Senator STEVENS, and Senator HATCH, and ask for additional cosponsors. I look forward to working with the Members of the Senate as we take these ideas that I presented today, this past week, presented in this bill, take these ideas, incorporate them with other ideas of my colleagues to come up with a final bill this year, or next year, that will in fact make a difference and will save lives, that will reduce crime.

Mr. President, thank you very much. At this point, I yield the floor.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS

S. 338

At the request of Mr. DASCHLE, the name of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. WELLSTONE] was added as a cosponsor of S. 338, a bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to extend the period of eligibility for inpatient care for veterans exposed to toxic substances, radiation, or environmental hazards, to extend the period of eligibility for outpatient care for veterans exposed to such substances or hazards during service in the Persian Gulf, and to expand the eligibility of veterans exposed to toxic substances or radiation for outpatient care.

S. 389

At the request of Mr. JOHNSTON, the name of the Senator from Colorado [Mr. BROWN] was added as a cosponsor of S. 389, a bill for the relief of Nguyen Quy An and his daughter, Nguyen Ngoc Kim Quy.

S. 433

At the request of Mr. KERRY, the name of the Senator from Illinois [Mr. SIMON] was added as a cosponsor of S. 433, a bill to regulate handgun ammunition, and for other purposes.

S. 619

At the request of Mr. SMITH, the name of the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. INHOFE] was added as a cosponsor of S. 619, a bill to phase out the use of mercury in batteries and provide for the efficient and cost-effective collection and recycling or proper disposal of used nickel cadmium batteries, small sealed lead-acid batteries, and certain other batteries, and for other purposes.

S. 641

At the request of Mrs. KASSEBAUM, the name of the Senator from Idaho

[Mr. CRAIG] was added as a cosponsor of S. 641, a bill to reauthorize the Ryan White CARE Act of 1990, and for other purposes.

S. 684

At the request of Mr. HATFIELD, the names of the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. PRYOR], the Senator from Maryland [Ms. MIKULSKI], and the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. LAUTENBERG] were added as cosponsors of S. 684, a bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for programs of research regarding Parkinson's disease, and for other purposes.

S. 689

At the request of Mrs. MURRAY, the name of the Senator from Washington [Mr. GORTON] was added as a cosponsor of S. 689, a bill to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act regarding the use of organic sorbents in landfills, and for other purposes.

S. 770

At the request of Mr. DOLE, the names of the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HEFLIN], and the Senator from Montana [Mr. BURNS] were added as cosponsors of S. 770, a bill to provide for the relocation of the United States Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, and for other purposes.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 14—RELATIVE TO THE PANAMA CANAL

Mr. HELMS (for himself, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. COVERDELL, Mr. MACK, Mr. THOMAS, Mr. SMITH, and Mr. D'AMATO) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. CON. RES. 14

Whereas the Panama Canal is a vital strategic asset to the United States, its allies, and the world;

Whereas the Treaty on the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal signed on September 7, 1977, provides that Panama and the United States have the responsibility to assure that the Panama Canal will remain open and secure;

Whereas such Treaty also provides that each of the two countries shall, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, defend the Canal against any threat to the regime of neutrality, and consequently shall have the right to act against any aggression or threat directed against the Canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the Canal;

Whereas the United States instrument of ratification of such Treaty includes specific language that the two countries should consider negotiating future arrangements or agreements to maintain military forces necessary to fulfill the responsibility of the two countries of maintaining the neutrality of the Canal after 1999;

Whereas the Government of Panama, in the bilateral Protocol of Exchange of instruments of ratification, expressly "agreed upon" such arrangements or agreements;

Whereas the Navy depends upon the Panama Canal for rapid transit in times of emergency, as demonstrated during World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Persian Gulf conflict;

Whereas drug trafficking and money laundering has proliferated in the Western Hemisphere since the Treaty on the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal was signed on September 7, 1977, and such trafficking and laundering poses a grave threat to peace and security in the region;

Whereas certain facilities now utilized by the United States Armed Forces in Panama are critical to combat the trade in illegal drugs;

Whereas the United States and Panama share common policy goals such as strengthening democracy, expanding economic trade, and combating illegal narcotics throughout Latin America;

Whereas the Government of Panama has dissolved its military force and has maintained only a civilian police organization to defend the Panama Canal against aggression; and

Whereas certain public opinion polls in Panama suggest that many Panamanians desire a continued United States military presence in Panama: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the President should negotiate a new base rights agreement with the Government of Panama—

(A) to allow the stationing of United States Armed Forces in Panama beyond December 31, 1999, and

(B) to ensure that the United States will be able to act appropriately, consistent with the Panama Canal Treaty, the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, and the resolutions of ratification thereto, for the purpose of assuring that the Panama Canal shall remain open, neutral, secure, and accessible; and

(2) the President should consult with the Congress throughout the negotiations described in paragraph (1).

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this concurrent resolution to the President.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, in a moment I shall send to the desk, a resolution urging the President to negotiate a new base rights agreement with the Government of Panama to permit the United States Armed Forces to remain in Panama beyond December 31, 1999. Senators CRAIG, COVERDELL, THOMAS, MACK, SMITH, and D'AMATO are principal cosponsors of the resolution, as are several other Senators who desire cosponsorship, and we will add those names this afternoon.

We feel strongly that it is in the United States strategic interest to maintain a military presence in Panama. Millions of Americans feel that the Senate allowed President Carter to give away the Panama Canal to the great detriment of the security of the United States, and it was indeed a perilous mistake.

But what is done is done; I am not here today to reopen the Panama Canal Treaty debate. That may come later. For the moment we seek only a simple base rights agreement—the kind of agreement we pursue with other countries in Europe and in Asia.

This resolution strongly advocates U.S. presence after the implementation of the existing canal treaties. We believe it to be obvious that a U.S. military presence offers the best means of protecting the canal and ensuring its neutrality.

Eighty percent of the Panamanians agree with that. The Panamanian Foreign Minister agrees with that.

If nothing is done, then the American flag will be lowered for the last time in Panama at noon on December 31, 1999, after having flown there for almost a century. Thus, absent any change in the matter, a historical and unique relationship between the United States and Panama will come to a close. The United States will withdraw completely its military presence from Panama, and this Senator is absolutely persuaded that should not happen.

In the Exchange of Instruments of the Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, a protocol—in “The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal” [Neutrality Treaty]—makes clear that nothing in the treaties precludes Panama and the United States from agreeing to the stationing of United States military forces or the maintenance of defense sites in Panama after December 1999. Specifically, the Permanent Neutrality Treaty states:

Nothing in the treaty shall preclude the Republic of Panama and the United States of America from making, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, any agreement or arrangement between the two countries to facilitate performance at any time after December 31, 1999, of their responsibilities to maintain the regime of neutrality established in the Treaty, including agreements or arrangements for the stationing of any United States military forces or the maintenance of defense sites after that date in the Republic of Panama that the Republic of Panama and the United States of America may deem necessary or appropriate.

Latin America is important to the United States, and vice versa. Every few years something dramatic happens in Latin America that has a direct impact on the United States, whether it be a security threat or a natural disaster. The United States needs a strategic military capability in the region, and maintaining United States military forces in Panama will give us the best option and capability.

Many Americans have the misleading impression that Latin America is as close and accessible as their back yard. While parts of Latin America are indeed only hours away, the vast majority of the region is not that easily or quickly accessible. Geographically, Europe is not even half the size of South America. Brazil is larger than the continental United States.

If total United States military withdrawal from Panama is allowed to happen, we will be left with no significant military presence in the region. Furthermore, it will be both politically difficult and enormously costly to reintroduce U.S. forces into the region.

Keeping United States forces in Panama promotes stable democracies and market economies throughout the region; also it helps support United States efforts to counter the flow of illegal drugs. Without question, then, United States forces offer the best protection and defense of the Panama Canal.

Although the United States is engaged in a draw-down of our forces

both overseas and in the United States, we are, nevertheless, leaving more than 135,000 troops in Europe and almost 100,000 in the Pacific. Maintaining forces overseas is part of the military mission. Congress budgets for this.

By the end of this year, however, only 6,000 troops will remain in Panama. This number will continue to diminish. In other words, United States presence in all of Latin America is a mere drop in the bucket compared to our presence in other parts of the world.

A continued United States presence is also supported by the Panamanian people. Current polls in Panama indicate that more than 70 percent of Panamanians questioned want the United States to maintain a military presence in Panama.

Since a continued U.S. military presence is in the interests of both nations, it is the time to negotiate a new base rights agreement. The Panama Canal treaties provide for a continued United States military presence, and the Panamanian public overwhelmingly favors it. The United States Congress should strongly urge the President to begin negotiating a new base rights agreement to keep United States military forces in Panama.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the results of a recent public opinion poll commissioned by the U.S. Information Agency be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

PANAMANIANS WANT U.S. TROOPS TO STAY

Most Panamanians still hold favorable views of the United States, despite political and economic frustrations since Operation “Just Cause” in 1989. Moreover, Panamanians continue to believe that some U.S. troops should remain in Panama after 1999, despite the Canal Treaty agreements on complete withdrawal.

KEY FINDINGS

In a September 1994 poll, large majorities expressed favorable opinions of the United States. Most thought the U.S. had “done much” to promote democracy and economic development in Panama.

An overwhelming majority rated the U.S.-Panama relationship as “good;” many called it “very” good. Many also thought the U.S. treated Panama with “dignity and respect,” but opinion was more negative on U.S. efforts to understand Panamanian problems. And a large majority thought the U.S. expected Panama to cede to its wishes on important issues.

Better than eight in ten continued to believe that at least some U.S. troops should remain in Panama beyond 1999—with half endorsing the maintenance of present troop levels and one-third favoring reduced levels. The main reasons given for the extended U.S. military presence were “security reasons” and “employment opportunities.”

Eight in ten or more also said it would be acceptable for U.S. troops to remain in Panama to provide security for the Canal, to continue the regional counter narcotics, fight, and to provide assistance in natural emergencies or for refugees. Better than six

in ten thought it acceptable that the U.S. provide support for American military forces in other parts of the hemisphere from Panama bases.

In contrast to widespread doubts expressed in previous years, half the public thought the Panamanian government would be able to manage the canal well when it assumes full control in the year 2000.

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES REMAINS VERY HIGH

Panamanians have faced a variety of political and economic frustrations since 1989 when General Manuel Noriega was removed from power. These appear to have had little effect on the favorable views most Panamanians have held of the United States.¹ In a September 1994 poll, eight in ten (82%)—across all regional and educational levels—voiced favorable opinions of the United States. Half (47%) expressed “very” favorable views, while just over one in ten (14%) regarded the U.S. unfavorably. On two key U.S. initiatives:

Eight in ten (83%) agreed that the U.S. had “done much to promote democracy” in Panama. Six in ten were in strong agreement, perhaps influenced in part by the successful democratic elections in May.²

A similar majority (82%) also thought that the U.S. had “done much to promote the economic development” of Panama. Again, six in ten agreed strongly with the statement.

MOST JUDGE THE U.S.-PANAMA RELATIONSHIP AS GOOD

A great majority believed that relations between Panama and the United States were good (89%); four in ten (39%) felt they were “very” good. Seven in ten agreed (72%)—and half (48%) “strongly” agreed—that the U.S. treats Panama with “dignity and respect.” (The university-educated were somewhat less likely to agree with this statement than Panamanians with less schooling.)

Public opinion was less favorable on two other aspects of the relationship:

Opinion was split about evenly on whether the U.S. tries to understand the problems facing Panama (44% said it does, 49% said it doesn’t).

A large majority agreed (80%; 58% “strongly”) that the U.S. expects Panama to “give in to its wishes in matters of importance to both countries.” This perception apparently did not influence favorable opinions on other issues, however.

MOST STILL WANT SOME U.S. TROOPS TO REMAIN—

Panamanians continue to want a U.S. military presence in Panama beyond December, 1999, when the Torrijos-Carter Canal Treaties stipulate the withdrawal of all American troops. There has been virtually no change in public attitudes on this issue since 1991: Half the public (50%) said the U.S. should maintain “about the same number of troops it has now,” while a third (35%) said the troop presence should remain in “reduced” form. Just one in ten (10%) preferred that all U.S. troops leave Panama. In general, the less-educated tended to support the status quo, while the university-educated were somewhat more likely to favor a reduced presence.

FOR SECURITY AND EMPLOYMENT REASONS

When those favoring a continued U.S. presence in Panama were asked why they

thought the troops should stay, most mentioned either the security of the canal (46%) or employment opportunities generated by the U.S. base (34%). Political stability was mentioned by only a few (7%).

In addition, when asked if it would be “acceptable” for U.S. troops to remain in Panama for selected purposes, large majorities say yes to the following: to provide security for the canal (87%); to continue the fight against illegal drugs in the region (87%); to provide assistance in times of natural disasters or for refugees in Panama (81%); and to provide support for U.S. military forces in other parts of the hemisphere (64%).

Only the last purpose, “support for U.S. military forces in other parts,” was considered “unacceptable” by significant minorities of the general public (27%) and the university-educated (40%).

CONFIDENCE INCREASES ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT OF CANAL

Public confidence in the Panamanian government’s ability to manage the canal when it assumes full control in 2000 appears to have increased in recent years: Half (51%) believed the government would manage the canal at least fairly well, while four in ten (42%) thought it would manage the canal badly. Interestingly, the university-educated were considerably more optimistic about the government’s management capacity than the less-educated (62% to 45%). Polls in 1990 and 1992 had found that large majorities believed the Panamanian government was paying little or no attention to canal-management matters and that it would be best if the U.S. and Panama managed the canal together.

HOW THIS POLL WAS TAKEN

This public opinion survey was commissioned by USIA and conducted by CID-Gallup of Costa Rica. It is based on face-to-face interviews with 1200 adults aged 18 and over in all regions of Panama. Fieldwork took place September 8-18, 1994. Sample construction and fieldwork were performed by CID in accordance with USIA instructions. Questions were written by USIA in consultation with AID and USIS Panama. They were translated by the contractor, with final review by USIA.

The survey sample was selected by a modified probability method, and covered both urban and rural populations. When necessary, respondent selection was adjusted for age, sex, and education to more closely match estimated population profiles.

Ninety-five times out of one hundred, results from samples of this size will yield results which differ by no more than about 3 percentage points in either direction from what would have been obtained were it possible to interview everyone in the population. The comparison of smaller subgroups increases the margin of error. In addition, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error.

Additional information on methodology may be obtained from the analyst.

SENATE RESOLUTION 120—ESTABLISHING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE ADMINISTERED BY THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

Mr. D’AMATO (for himself and Mr. DOLE) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to:

S. RES. 120

Resolved,

SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a special committee administered by the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to be known as the “Special Committee to Investigate Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters” (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the “special committee”).

(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the special committee are—

(1) to conduct an investigation and public hearings into, and study of, whether improper conduct occurred regarding the way in which White House officials handled documents in the office of White House Deputy Counsel Vincent Foster following his death;

(2) to conduct an investigation and public hearings into, and study of, the following matters developed during, or arising out of, the investigation and public hearings concluded by the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs prior to the adoption of this resolution—

(A) whether any person has improperly handled confidential Resolution Trust Corporation (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the “RTC”) information relating to Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association or Whitewater Development Corporation, including whether any person has improperly communicated such information to individuals referenced therein;

(B) whether the White House has engaged in improper contacts with any other agency or department in the Government with regard to confidential RTC information relating to Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association or Whitewater Development Corporation;

(C) whether the Department of Justice has improperly handled RTC criminal referrals relating to Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association or Whitewater Development Corporation;

(D) whether RTC employees have been improperly importuned, prevented, restrained, or deterred in conducting investigations or making enforcement recommendations relating to Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association or Whitewater Development Corporation; and

(E) whether the report issued by the Office of Government Ethics on July 31, 1994, or related transcripts of deposition testimony—

(i) were improperly released to White House officials or others prior to their testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs pursuant to Senate Resolution 229 (103d Congress); or

(ii) were used to communicate to White House officials or to others confidential RTC information relating to Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association or Whitewater Development Corporation;

(3) to conduct an investigation and public hearings into, and study of, all matters that have any tendency to reveal the full facts about—

(A) the operations, solvency, and regulation of Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association, and any subsidiary, affiliate, or other entity owned or controlled by Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association;

(B) the activities, investments, and tax liability of Whitewater Development Corporation and, as related to Whitewater Development Corporation, of its officers, directors, and shareholders;

(C) the policies and practices of the RTC and the Federal banking agencies (as that term is defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act) regarding the legal representation of such agencies with respect to Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association;

¹ A USIA poll in mid-1990 found that 87 percent approved (77% “strongly”) of the U.S. sending troops to remove Gen. Noriega and 75 percent considered the operation a “liberation” rather than an “invasion.”

² The winner, Perez Balladares, was inaugurated just a week before interviewing for the poll began on September 8.